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Prepare-and-measure (P&M) quantum networks are the basic building blocks of quantum com-
munication and cryptography. These networks crucially rely on non-orthogonal quantum encodings
to distribute quantum correlations, thus enabling superior communication rates and information-
theoretic security. Here, we present a computational toolbox that is able to efficiently characterise
the set of input-output probability distributions for any discrete-variable P&M quantum network,
assuming only the inner-product information of the quantum encodings. Our toolbox is thus highly
versatile and can be used to analyse a wide range of quantum network protocols, including those that
employ infinite-dimensional quantum code states. To demonstrate the feasibility and efficacy of our
toolbox, we use it to reveal new results in multipartite quantum distributed computing and quantum
cryptography. Taken together, these findings suggest that our method may have implications for
quantum network information theory and the development of new quantum technologies.
Introduction. Quantum correlations [1–3] (namely, en-
tanglement, nonlocality, steering correlations, etc) are
essential resources in quantum information processing.
In short, they are the reason why we see such unique
advantages in quantum communication, cryptography,
computing, and imaging. The general observation is
that the stronger these correlations are, the more pow-
erful quantum information becomes. This is especially
the case for quantum communication [4] and quantum
cryptography[5], where stronger entanglement means
higher quantum fidelity and stronger information secu-
rity. For this reason, the characterisation of quantum
correlations is an integral step in many quantum infor-
mation protocols and a central research topic in quantum
information science.
In this work, we are interested in characterising the
correlations of prepare-and-measure (P&M) quantum
networks. These are the basic building blocks of quantum
communication and quantum cryptography. The central
task of a P&M quantum network is to send a classical
message z over a quantum network to a group of re-
ceivers. This message could be anything, e.g., a secret
key, elements of a database, or a signed certificate—it
depends on the function of the protocol. Quantum en-
coding is done by preparing a quantum signal in one of
the n predefined pure states, {|ψz〉}nz=1 (determined by
the input z), and decoding is accomplished by making a
measurement (sampled from a finite set of decoding set-
tings) on the output quantum signal. For a generic P&M
quantum network with k spatially separated receivers,
we write p(a1a2 . . . am|x1x2 . . . xk, z) to denote the prob-
ability of obtaining outcomes a1a2 . . . ak given decoding
functions x1x2 . . . xk and message z. We further use p to
denote the entire list of input-output probability distri-
butions.
∗ charles.lim@nus.edu.sg
Our broad goal is to reveal the fundamental limits of
P&M quantum networks without restrictions on the net-
work and local decoding strategies. In particular, we
are interested in identifying the set of quantum-realisable
correlations p (henceforth called the quantum set) us-
ing only the knowledge of the quantum encoding scheme
{|ψz〉}z as the constraining factor. This type of ap-
proach is extremely useful for analysing the performance
of quantum communication and quantum cryptography.
For instance, one can use the quantum set to derive lower
bounds on the quantum network’s error probabilities [6–
8]. These bounds essentially tell us what the quantum
encoding {|ψz〉}z could achieve in practice, be it for quan-
tum cryptography, communication, or distributed com-
puting purposes, as we shall show later.
Also, from the perspective of quantum information the-
ory, this approach draws a direct connection between
the distinguishability of quantum states and quantum
correlations. More concretely, we first note that if the
quantum encoding {|ψz〉}z is completely orthogonal, i.e.,
〈ψz|ψz′〉 = δzz′ , then p is generally ‘unconstrained’. That
is, such encodings are classical states and hence can be
arbitrarily copied— as such, there are no physical prin-
ciples that constrain what the input-output probability
distribution could be (except for the usual normalisa-
tion requirements). The interesting part comes when the
encoding {|ψz〉}z is non-orthogonal. In this case, there
are two unique consequences. Firstly, it is generally im-
possible for every receiver to learn the same informa-
tion about z. This is due to the fact that one cannot
clone non-orthogonal states [9], and consequently, there
is a global trade-off between the amount of accessible
information that each receiver can receive [10, 11]. Sec-
ondly, no receiver can completely learn z even if he or
she has received |ψz〉 with perfect fidelity. This is be-
cause non-orthogonal states are fundamentally indistin-
guishable: there is no measurement that can discriminate
them with perfect reliability [12]. Consequently, proba-
bility assignments like p(a = z|x) = 1 are forbidden.
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2Taken together, these imply that, contrary to orthog-
onal (classical) encodings, correlations emanating from
quantum encodings have non-trivial constraints (e.g., see
quantum broadcasting [13, 14]).
Results. To tackle the above characterisation problem,
we propose a general computational method that is able
to approximate (from the outside) the quantum set of any
P&M quantum network. The approximation is based on
a hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations, which is a general-
isation and novel application of earlier research in quan-
tum nonlocality [2, 15–20]. A key feature of our method is
that it is semi-device-independent (SDI) [21–27]. That is,
the analysis provided is independent of how the network
and measurements are implemented (as required above).
The method only requires that the quantum encoding
{|ψz〉}z is characterised in terms of its Gram matrix, i.e.,
〈ψz|ψz′〉 = λzz′ , which in practice can be easily obtained
by taking the inner products of the quantum code states
(i.e., using their specifications).
The main advantage with this approach is that the di-
mension of the encoding system is no longer necessary in
the analysis: using the Gram matrix information alone
is enough to characterise the quantum set. In this sense,
our approach is more practical than the standard SDI
approach, which assumes the dimension of the quantum
encoding system [21–24]; notice that physical dimension
is generally difficult to fix in practice as actual systems
have multiple degrees of freedom. We remark that al-
ternative SDI approaches based on bounded energy con-
straints [26] and the transmission of non-orthogonal bi-
nary states [27] have also been proposed. These have
similar advantages as our approach, but present analy-
ses using these approaches are so far limited to binary
code states. It remains to be seen if these can be readily
generalised to multiple code states, schemes which are
often used in quantum technologies. In the following, we
show that our method can be used to efficiently analyse
any practical quantum communication protocol [28], in-
cluding those that use multiple infinite-dimensional code
states.
To keep our presentation concise, we restrict the dis-
cussion to two-receiver P&M quantum networks (see Fig-
ure 1); extension to larger networks is straightforward.
Consider a prepare-and-measure quantum task, where
random code states are sent across a network to two
independent receivers, called Alice and Bob, for mea-
surement. For simplicity, we divide the task into two
phases: a distribution phase and a measurement phase.
In the first phase, a classical random source z is encoded
into a quantum system |ψz〉 and distributed to Alice and
Bob via an untrusted quantum network. For this type
of transmission, it is useful to work in the purification
picture, where state transformations are given by uni-
tary evolutions [29]. That is, by working in a higher-
dimensional Hilbert space, we may see the transmission
as an isometric evolution that takes |ψz〉 to some pure
output state |φz〉, which is now shared between the re-
ceivers and the network environment (the purification
system). The key advantage of this picture is that while
the dimension and possibly other properties of |ψz〉 may
change after the transmission, the inner-product infor-
mation of {|φz〉}z remains the same: 〈φz|φz′〉 = 〈ψz|ψz′〉.
Importantly, this means that our initial knowledge about
〈ψz|ψz′〉 = λzz′ is preserved in the transformed states.
In the measurement phase, Alice and Bob perform in-
dependent and random measurements on |φz〉 to gain
information about z. Since there are only two receivers
here, we revert back to the usual convention and denote
Alice’s and Bob’s measurements by x and y and their
corresponding measurement outcomes by a and b, respec-
tively. Then, using the quantum Born rule, we have that
the probability of observing outcomes a, b given measure-
ments x, y and |φz〉 is
p(ab|xy, z) = 〈φz|EaxEby|φz〉, (1)
where {Eax} and {Eby} are projective measurements sat-
isfying the following properties: (i) for any x, EaxE
a′
x = 0
for a 6= a′, (ii) ∑aEax = I, (iii) (Eax)2 = Eax = (Eax)†,
and (iv) [Eax , E
b
y] = 0. We note that there is no loss of
generality in assuming projective measurements here. In-
deed, we can always lift any measurement to a projective
one by working in a higher-dimensional Hilbert space; in
our case this is possible since the dimension of the net-
work is not fixed. The last property reflects the fact that
Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are separable and hence
the application of one has no effect on the outcome of the
other.
Our characterisation problem is thus the following:
Given an n × n Hermitian positive-semidefinite matrix
λ, what is the corresponding quantum set p? We denote
this set by Q(λ). In principle, solving this problem would
require optimising over all possible quantum states and
measurements in equation (1) subject to the constraints
〈φz|φz′〉 = λzz′ . However, this task is computationally
intractable: the dimension of the network is not fixed
and thus could be infinite. To overcome this obstacle, we
take inspiration from the characterisation techniques [16–
20] developed in Bell nonlocality research [2, 15], which
is a special case of our problem. Recall that in a Bell
experiment, local random measurements are made on a
fixed source |φ〉 instead of a varying source |φz〉. Notably,
it was shown in refs [19, 20] that the set of quantum
probabilities derived from Bell experiments can be ap-
proximated via a hierarchy of membership tests. There,
the basic idea is to bound the quantum set using a se-
quence of weaker (but tractable) characterisation tasks,
which nevertheless still represent very well the original
problem.
In this work, we show that a similar characterisation
technique can also be devised for the general problem.
More specifically, we give a general procedure for deriving
(tractable) necessary conditions for any discrete-variable
P&M quantum network. To start with, consider a quan-
tum probability distribution p(ab|xy, z) = 〈φz|EaxEby|φz〉,
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FIG. 1. Scenario and assumptions. The behaviour of a two-receiver P&M quantum network is generally described by p = [p(ab|xy, z)],
which expresses the probability of z transiting to outcomes a, b given measurement inputs x, y. In the quantum setting, the set of conditional
probabilities are given by p(ab|xy, z) = 〈φz |EaxEby |φz〉, with the constraint that 〈φz |φz′ 〉 = λzz′ is fixed. Our consideration hence assumes
three conditions: (1) the set of code states are pure states, (2) the Gram matrix of these states is known, and (3) the receivers are
independent of each other (they do not share any quantum resources, although classical randomness is allowed).
where 〈φz|φz′〉 = λzz′ , and with {Eax , Eby}a,x,b,y satisfy-
ing properties (i)–(iv). Let S = {S1, . . . , Sm} be a finite
set of m operators, where each element is a linear combi-
nation of products of {Eax , Eby}a,x,b,y. Then define G to
be the nm× nm block matrix
G =
n∑
z,z′=1
Gzz
′ ⊗ |ez〉〈ez′ |,
where Gzz
′
(i,j) = 〈φz|S†i Sj |φz′〉 for all z, z′ ∈ [n], i, j ∈ [m].
Here we denote by {|ez〉}nz=1 the standard orthonormal
basis of Cn and by Gzz′(i,j) the ij-entry of the matrix G
zz′ .
By construction, the matrix G is Hermitian and positive-
semidefinite (PSD) [30]. Furthermore, properties (i)–(iv)
of the measurement operators and the inner-product con-
straints 〈φz|φz′〉 = λzz′ translate to linear conditions on
the entries of G. To see this, we note that if the set S
contains operators {Eax}a,x and {Eby}b,y, then it can be
easily verified that G satisfies∑
b
Gzz(a,x),(b,y) =
∑
b
p(ab|xy, z)∑
a
Gzz
′
(a,x),(a,x) = λzz′ .
Therefore, for any discretely modulated P&M quan-
tum network, it is always possible to define a PSD matrix
that captures the original quantum model (1) in terms
of constraints that are linear in its entries. Importantly,
the existence of such a matrix provides us with a powerful
means to check if a given p is of quantum origin. More
specifically, we can use semidefinite programming (SDP)
techniques [31] to verify if p is in the set of compatible
PSD matrices: if p is not a member, we conclude that it
is not quantum realisable. However, successful member-
ship does not necessarily mean p is of quantum origin.
This is due to the fact that our characterisation method
is a semidefinite relaxation [32] of the original problem
and hence can only provide an outer-approximation of
Q(λ).
However, by introducing additional linear constraints
via a hierarchical procedure, it is possible to gain a tighter
characterisation of Q(λ). In particular, we could use
the hierarchy proposed in refs. [19, 20] to build a se-
ries of increasingly stringent membership tests, where
the associated Gram matrix G grows bigger in each step
and more constraints are generated. More precisely, we
define a sequence of hierarchical sets S1 = {Eax , Eby},
S2 = S1 ∪ {EaxEa
′
x′} ∪ {EbyEb
′
y′} ∪ {EaxEby}, where Sk is
defined inductively as the set of all operator sequences
constructed from Eax , E
b
y satisfying Sk ⊆ Sk+1. This cor-
responds to a sequence of Gram matrices, G1, G2, . . . with
increasing size and constraints. Since the Gram matrix
Gk of a particular kth step is at least as informative as
a smaller sized Gram matrix Gk
′
, we conclude that the
approximated set Q(λ)k is a subset of Q(λ)k′ . Therefore,
moving up the hierarchy gives a tighter approximation of
the quantum set: Q(λ) ⊆ Q(λ)k ⊆ Q(λ)k−1 . . .. In Ap-
pendix A, we prove that this hierarchy is in fact sufficient:
it converges to the quantum set, limk→∞Q(λ)k = Q(λ).
Nevertheless, in the applications below, we see that low-
level approximations are already enough to achieve very
tight bounds.
Applications. Our method can be applied to any quan-
tum communication task that employs the prepare-and-
measure scheme. To illustrate this point, we provide two
examples of application: (1) distributed quantum ran-
dom access coding (QRAC) [33, 34] and (2) quantum
key distribution (QKD) [35, 36].
In the first, we consider a distributed computing task
where two random bits z0z1 are encoded into a quantum
state |ψz0z1〉 and sent to Alice and Bob for selective de-
coding. For the decoding part, Alice and Bob are each
4given a random position bit and their goal is to guess the
input bit that is associated with the position bit. For ex-
ample, if Alice receives x = 1, she has to guess the value
of z1 via measurement on her share of |ψz0z1〉. This task
can be seen as a type of distributed quantum database,
where network users can choose to learn any entry of the
database; this includes the case whereby multiple users
can choose to learn the same entry. To this end, we quan-
tify the network’s ability to distribute information by Al-
ice’s and Bob’s guessing probabilities, which we denote
by p(a = zx) and p(b = zy), respectively.
At this point, it is useful to recall that if |ψz0z1〉 is
a two-level quantum system (i.e., a qubit), then the
best encoding strategy (in the case of the standard two-
party QRAC) is to use the so-called conjugate coding
scheme [37]: |ψ00〉 = |+〉, |ψ10〉 = |+i〉, |ψ01〉 = |−i〉, and
|ψ11〉 = |−〉, where |±〉 and |±i〉 are the eigenstates of
the Pauli operators X and Y, respectively. This gives a
guessing probability of
(
1 + 1/
√
2
)
/2 ≈ 0.853 [33, 34],
which is optimal for qubit code states. Interestingly, us-
ing our method, we find that similar bounds can be es-
tablished using only the Gram matrix information of the
code states. In particular, we consider a set of code states
{|ψ00〉, |ψ11〉, |ψ10〉, |ψ01〉}, whose Gram matrix is fixed to
that of {|+〉, |−〉, |+i〉, |−i〉}, and ask what is Alice’s op-
timal guessing probability given Bob’s guessing probabil-
ity is fixed. Our method predicts the following quantum
boundary: (2p(a = zx) − 1)2 + (2p(b = zy) − 1)2 ≤ 1/2,
which is drawn in Figure 2. The semidefinite program
for this optimisation is provided in Appendix B.
Three remarks are in order here. Firstly, we see that
the boundary (obtained from Q(λ)1) gives the same up-
per bound as ref. [33] when one of the receivers is re-
stricted to random guessing. This can be seen as the
case in which one party receives |ψz0z1〉 with perfect fi-
delity and the other party receives a dummy state. Sec-
ondly, the boundary specifies a non-trivial trade-off func-
tion between Alice’s and Bob’s guessing probabilities,
which is independent of their measurement strategies.
This implies that the bound is absolute and cannot be
improved upon with better measurement strategies, even
if Alice and Bob are allowed to use shared randomness.
Thirdly, although our method can only provide an outer-
approximation of the quantum set, it turns out that the
first level of the hierarchy is already tight. More specif-
ically, there is a concrete example which saturates the
boundary predicted by Q(λ)1; see Figure 2 for more de-
tails. This example is given by the optimal asymmetric
qubit cloning machine [38], which optimally splits the
qubit information between multiple parties (according to
some predefined ratio); this is indeed a natural choice as
the goal of the network is to preserve as much quantum
information as possible for each party while splitting it.
In the second application, we prove the security of
coherent-state QKD. Here, one of the receivers (Alice)
is the eavesdropper (renamed to Eve) and her goal is to
eavesdrop on the quantum channel connecting the trans-
mitter and the other receiver (Bob). For concreteness,
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FIG. 2. Distributed two-receiver QRAC. The boundary is
generated using the first level of the SDP hierarchy. In princi-
ple, the boundary is not necessarily tight, for Q(λ)1 may con-
tain correlations that are not of quantum origin. However, in
our case we show that the derived boundary is tight: it is sat-
urated by the optimal asymmetric qubit cloning machine. Sup-
pose the quantum code states are given by the conjugate cod-
ing scheme: |ψ00〉 = |+〉|0〉, |ψ10〉 = |+i〉|0〉, |ψ01〉 = |−i〉|0〉,
and |ψ11〉 = |−〉|0〉. The quantum network is assumed to be an
asymmetric cloning channel Uf : |0〉|0〉 → |0〉|0〉 and |1〉|0〉 →√
1− f |1〉|0〉 + √f |0〉|1〉, where f ∈ [0, 1]. For the decoding, we
assume that Alice and Bob perform the optimal QRAC qubit
measurements: Eax = (I + (−1)a(X + (−1)x+1Y)/
√
2)/2, Eby =
(I+ (−1)b(X+ (−1)y+1Y)/√2)/2. Using these and setting the left
subsystem as Alice’s and the right subsystem as Bob’s, we have that
p(a = zx) = 1/2 +
√
(1− f)/2/2 and p(b = zy) = 1/2 +
√
f/2/2.
These give (2p(a = zx) − 1)2 + (2p(b = zy) − 1)2 = 1/2, which is
the quantum boundary predicted by the Q(λ)1 set.
we first consider a phase encoded coherent-state QKD
protocol [39], which uses the encoding scheme |ψz0z1〉:
|ψ00〉 = |√µ〉, |ψ10〉 = |−√µ〉, |ψ01〉 = |i√µ〉, and
|ψ11〉 = |−i√µ〉, where µ is the mean photon number
of the coherent state. To maximise the sifting efficiency
of the protocol, we use {|√µ〉, |−√µ〉} for key generation
and {|i√µ〉, |−i√µ〉} for testing the security of the chan-
nel. Correspondingly on Bob’s side, we have that he uses
measurement y = 0 for key recovery and measurement
y = 1 for estimating the channel noise; we write ε0 and
ε1 to denote the error probabilities observed in the key
basis and the test basis, respectively. In this case, the
sifting rate of the protocol tends to 1 (in the limit of infi-
nite keys) when the probability of choosing the key basis
goes to 1 [35].
In Appendix C, we show that the expected secret key
rate (per signal sent) is
R∞key ≥ max{0, pdet [1− h2(ε0)− h2(εph)]}, (2)
where εph is the so-called phase error rate of the key
basis [41], pdet is the probability of detection, and h2(·)
is the binary entropy function. The quantity of interest
here is εph, which is maximised assuming fixed system
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FIG. 3. Phase encoded coherent-state QKD We compare
our secret key rate against the one given in ref. [40]. For the
key rate simulation, we assume a detector dark count rate of
pdc = 10
−7 and an intrinsic optical error rate of 2%. For a
given channel loss 1 − η, the probability of detecting a signal
is pdet = 1 − (1 − pdc)2 exp(−2ηµ) and the error probability is
ε = (pdc + (1 − exp (−2µη))0.02)/pdet. Using these, we maximise
the expected secret key rate (2). More precisely, we perform two
optimisations. First, for a given µ we maximise the phase error rate
over Q(λ)2 subject to the above constraints. This gives us a lower
bound on the achievable secret key rate. Then, we optimise the se-
cret key rate over µ. This gives us an estimate of the optimal secret
key rate. Comparing to the secret key rate of ref. [40] (red line), we
see that our method predicts a higher secret key rate (blue line) for
any loss point. For further comparison, we also plotted the collec-
tive beam-splitting attack bound[42] (the top curve: black dashed
line), which serves as an upper-bound on the achievable secret key
rate; note that this bound is not tight and it assumes zero errors.
parameters (e.g., µ, ε0 and ε1). More specifically, we use
the second level of the hierarchy S2 and maximise εph
over the set of compatible probabilities in Q(λ)2. The
outcome of the numerical optimisation is shown in Figure
3 along with the simulation parameters. To benchmark
our results against the best known security analysis for
the protocol, we also plot the security bound of ref [40]
using the same constraints. From the figure, it is evi-
dent that our secret key rates are always higher than the
ones given by ref. [40]. Importantly, this shows that our
method significantly improves the security and feasibil-
ity of practical QKD, despite making only a few assump-
tions about the implementation. For completeness, we
note that refs. [43, 44] have also recently proposed a new
security proof technique based on semidefinite program-
ming (but using a completely different approach). In the
case of the current protocol, their simulation outcomes
are similar to ours, however their method additionally
requires that Bob’s measurements are fully characterised
and an optical squashing model exists for the measure-
ments [45].
To demonstrate the ability of our method to han-
dle non-standard QKD protocols, we consider the secu-
rity of a modified coherent-one-way (COW) QKD pro-
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FIG. 4. Time encoded coherent-state QKD For this simula-
tion, we consider an error model that is based on imperfect inten-
sity modulation and imperfect mixing of coherent states. On the
transmitter’s side, we assume that the intensity modulator used
to perform the on-off keying has finite extinction ratio, i.e., states
are prepared as |√1− δα〉 and |√δα〉 instead of |α〉 and |0〉. Here,
we use δ = 0.01. On the receiver side, we assume that the beam-
splitter in the measurement scheme of ref. [48] has a ratio of 51/49
instead of the ideal 50/50. Using these component models and as-
suming that each detector has a dark count rate of pdc = 10
−7, we
run the optimisation as per the previous QKD application and ob-
tain four sets of data points using the original COW QKD encoding
and a new encoding strategy where the test sequence is optimised.
For each of these, we compute the secret key rates with and without
errors.
tocol [46, 47], which is based on the transmission of
time encoded coherent states {|0〉|α〉, |α〉|0〉, |α〉|α〉} with
α =
√
µ. Here, the first two sequences of coherent states
carry the secret bit (i.e., ‘0’ → |0〉|α〉 and ‘1’ → |α〉|0〉)
and the last sequence is a test state used to estimate Eve’s
information about the secret bit. For Bob’s measure-
ments, we use the active switching measurement scheme
proposed in ref. [48] instead of the original passive switch-
ing scheme [46]. In this setup, Bob employs an optical
switch to send the incoming states either into the data
line or the monitoring line: the former measures the ar-
rival time of the incoming states while the latter mea-
sures the coherence (the interference visibility) between
two adjacent states. The advantage of this scheme is
that it yields higher detection probabilities than the pas-
sive scheme. Another major modification is that only
the coherence of the test sequence |α〉|α〉 is measured.
More specifically, the variant protocol does not measure
the coherence between adjacent encodings (e.g., in cases
like |0〉|α〉; |α〉|0〉 or |α〉|α〉; |α〉|0〉) like in the original pro-
tocol. This modification is largely motivated by earlier
research which showed that knowing the coherence infor-
mation between adjacent encodings does not significantly
improve the security of the protocol [48]. Importantly, in
discarding these events, we have two benefits. Firstly, the
security analysis is greatly simplified, i.e., we only need
to analyse a single encoding instead of a sequence of en-
6codings, which can be unwieldy. Secondly, this opens
up the possibility to explore scenarios whereby the mean
photon number of the test sequence |α〉|α〉 is optimised.
More concretely, we can now adjust the mean photon
number of the test sequence to maximise the secret key
rate. In the following, we will use |β〉|β〉 to represent the
optimised test sequence.
Using the same approach as before (i.e., equation
(2)), we compute the secret key rate of the variant
protocol using a realistic error model that assumes
an imperfect intensity modulator (on the transmitter
side) and an imbalanced beam-splitter on the receiver
side; see the description of Figure 4 for more details.
We first simulate the expected secret key rates of the
protocol using the original COW QKD test sequence
|β = α〉|β = α〉 with errors (red curve) and without
errors (yellow curve). Both of these curves show that
secret keys can only be distributed in the low loss regime
(i.e., less than 4 dB loss; or equivalently 20 km of optical
fibre length). Comparing to the collective beam-splitting
attack curve [42] (black dashed curve), we observe that
the original COW QKD encoding may be sub-optimal.
To investigate this possibility, we use the flexibility of
our method and further optimise |β〉|β〉 over a discrete
set of ratios β/α to search for the best test sequence for a
given loss point. We find that the improvement is highly
significant. In the case with zero errors, the optimal
ratio is β = α/2 and the tolerable loss is extended to
more than 35 dB, which spells a ≥ 30 dB improvement
over the original COW QKD encoding. The secret key
rates (green curve) are also significantly higher and are
close to the collective beam-splitting attack bound (in
the low loss regime). In the case with errors, we also see
similar improvements. More concretely, the optimised
variant protocol is now able to distribute secret keys
up to about 21 dB loss with errors, which translates to
a fibre distance of about 110 km. In conclusion, our
findings strongly indicate that it is much more secure to
vary the mean photon number of the test sequence.
Outlook. Taken together, our findings thus provide a
powerful method to analyse the quantum set of any
discretely modulated P&M quantum network, indepen-
dently of how the network and decoding measurements
are implemented. From the perspective of quantum in-
formation theory, the toolbox can help to reveal the fun-
damental limits of quantum communication and to anal-
yse the performance of any quantum coding scheme. On
the application side, the toolbox can be used to anal-
yse the performance of quantum network protocols and
the security of quantum cryptography, as evidenced by
the three examples given above. Concerning the latter, it
would be interesting to investigate how the toolbox could
be utilised to solve the other open problems in quantum
cryptography. For example, the security of round-robin
differential phase-shift QKD [49] or continuous variable
QKD protocols with discrete modulations [50].
Acknowledgements. We acknowledge support from
the National University of Singapore and the Centre for
Quantum Technologies.
7Appendix A: Convergence of the hierarchy
In the main text we saw how to construct an infinite sequence of decreasing semidefinite programming outer
approximations to the quantum set Q(λ). In the following, we show that the proposed hierarchy converges to Q(λ).
The proof is a straightforward generalisation of the convergence proof from [20].
For any integer ` ≥ 1 let SDP` be the semidefinite program of size n|S`| × n|S`| defined by the linear constraints
identified in the main text. Let G` be a feasible solution to SDP`. For the convergence proof, it is instructive to think
of G` as an n× n block matrix, where each block has size |S`| × |S`|, i.e.,
G` =
∑
zz′
G`,zz
′ ⊗ |ez〉〈ez′ |, (A1)
where the entries of G`,zz
′
are indexed by S`. Furthermore, let Q(λ)` be the projection of the set of feasible solutions
to SPD` to the relevant coordinates, i.e.,
Q(λ)` =
{(
G`,zz
′)
z,a,b
: G` =
∑
zz′
G`,zz
′ ⊗ |ez〉〈ez′ | is feasible for SDP`
}
.
Theorem: We have that Q(λ) = ∩∞`=1Q(λ)`.
Proof. We have already seen that Q(λ) ⊆ ∩∞`=1Q(λ)`. We now show the other inclusion.
We start with some comments concerning the proof. First, to ease notation, we assume that measurement outcomes
uniquely define the measurement they correspond to. We denote by X(a) (resp. X(b)) the measurement corresponding
to Alice’s outcome a (resp. Bob’s outcome b). This convention allows us to write p(ab|z) as opposed to p(ab|xy, z),
which is used in the main text. A quantum realization of p(ab|z) is given by p(ab|z) = 〈φz|EaEb|φz〉, where E†a = Ea,
EaEa′ = δa,a′Ea if X(a) = X(a
′), and [Ea, Eb] = 0. Second, for any z, z′ ∈ [n], the |S`|× |S`| matrix G`,zz′ is indexed
by the operators in the set S`. Operators U,Ea, EaU, and I will be associated with row or column indices, u, a, au,
and 1, respectively. Consider a distribution p(ab|z) ∈ ∩∞`=1Q(λ)` and let G` be a level-` certificate.
Step 1: For any integer ` ≥ 1, we have that
|G`(z,u),(z′,v)| ≤ 1, for all z ∈ [n] and u, v ∈ S`, (A2)
where G`(z,u),(z′,v) is the (u, v) entry of G
`,zz′ As G` is positive semidefinite, it suffices to show that
0 ≤ G`(z,u),(z,u) ≤ 1, for all z ∈ [n] and u ∈ S`. (A3)
To get (A2) from (A3), consider the 2× 2 principal submatrix of G` indexed by (z, u) and (z′, v), i.e.,(
G`(z,u),(z,u) G
`
(z,u),(z′,v)
G`(z′,v),(z,u) G
`
(z,v),(z,v)
)
.
As this matrix is PSD, its determinant is nonnegative. Combined with (A3), this implies that
|G`(z,u),(z′,v)| ≤
√
G`(z,u),(z,u)G
`
(z,v),(z,v) ≤ 1.
Lastly, we prove (A3). Trivially, we have that I†Ea = E†aEa, and thus, G`(z,1),(z,a) = G
`
(z,a),(z,a). As G
` is PSD, the
2× 2 principal submatrix of G` indexed by the words (z, 1) and (z, a) is also PSD, i.e.,(
G`(z,1),(z,1) G
`
(z,1),(z,a)
G`(z,a),(z,1) G
`
(z,a),(z,a)
)
=
(
1 G`(z,a),(z,a)
G`(z,a),(z,a) G
`
(z,a),(z,a)
)
 0,
which in turn implies that 0 ≤ G`(z,a),(z,a) ≤ 1 for all a.
Step 2: Next we embed all matrices G` in a single normed space (we need to do this as they have different sizes)
where the sequence has a convergent subsequence. For this, we append zeros to extend each matrix G` to an infinite
matrix Gˆ`, which is indexed by all words |u|, |v| = 0, 1, 2, ...
8Now, by Step 1, all matrices Gˆ` lie in the unit ball of the Banach space `∞. Furthermore, it is well-known that
`∞ is the dual space of `1 [51]. Thus, by the Banach-Alaogly theorem [51], the sequence (Gˆ`)` has a convergent
subsequence, with respect to the weak∗ topology, i.e., there exists an infinite matrix G∞ such that
Gˆ`j
w∗→ G∞, as j →∞. (A4)
Equation (A4) has two important consequences. First, by the definition of the weak* topology, it also implies point-
wise convergence, i.e.,
lim
j→∞
Gˆ
`j
(z,u),(z′,v) = G
∞
(z,u),(z′,v), for all z, z
′ ∈ [n] and words u, v. (A5)
Second, the infinite matrix G∞ is a PSD kernel [52]. As G` is feasible for SDP` we have that
G`(z,a),(z,b) = p(ab|z), G`(z,1),(z′,1) = λzz′ , G`(z,u1),(z′,v1) = G`(z,u2),(z′,v2), when U†1V1 = U†2V2, (A6)
which combined with (A5) implies that
G∞(z,a),(z,b) = p(ab|z), G∞(z,1),(z′,1) = λzz′ , G∞(z,u1),(z′,v1) = G∞(z,u2),(z′,v2) when U†1V1 = U†2V2. (A7)
Furthermore, as G∞ is a PSD kernel, there exists a (possibly infinite dimensional) Hilbert space (H, 〈·, ·〉) and vectors
{x(z,u) : z = 1, . . . , n, |u| ∈ N} ⊆ H such that
G∞(z,u),(z,v) = 〈x(z,u), x(z,v)〉, for all u, v, and z ∈ [n]. (A8)
This process is the infinite dimensional analogue of the Cholesky decomposition [30].
Step 3: Using the vectors from (A8) we construct a quantum realization for p(ab|z) ∈ ∩∞`=1Q(λ)`. Specifically, for
z ∈ [n] define the quantum states |ψz〉 = |x(z,1)〉 and the measurement operators
E˜a = proj(span(|x(z,ua)〉 : z ∈ [n], u ∈ W)) and E˜b = proj(span(|x(z,ub)〉 : z ∈ [n], u ∈ W)). (A9)
It remains to show that E˜a, E˜b such that p(a, b|z) = 〈ψz|E˜aE˜b|ψz〉. From the relation
(EaU)
†Ea′V = δa,a′U†EaV, when X(a) = X(a′), (A10)
we get that
G∞(z,au),(z′,a′v) = δa,a′G
∞
(z,u),(z′,av), for all z, z
′ ∈ [n]. (A11)
Using (A8), Equation (A11) implies that
〈x(z,au)|x(z′,a′v)〉 = δa,a′〈x(z,u)|x(z′,av)〉, when X(a) = X(a′). (A12)
In particular, (A12) implies that
〈x(z,au)|x(z′,a′v)〉 = 0, when X(a) = X(a′) and a 6= a′, (A13)
which implies that
E˜aE˜a′ = δa,a′E˜a, when X(a) = X(a
′). (A14)
Furthermore, we have that
E˜a|x(z,u)〉 = E˜a|x(z,au)〉+ E˜a(|x(z,u)〉 − |x(z,au)〉) = E˜a|x(z,au)〉 = |x(z,au)〉, (A15)
where for the last equality we use the definition of E˜a and for the second to last equality we use that E˜a(|x(z,u)〉 −
|x(z,au)〉) = 0; This follows from the following chain of implications:
(EaU)
†V = (EaU)†EaV =⇒ G∞(z,au),(z′,v) = G∞(z,au),(z′,av) =⇒ 〈x(z,au)|x(z,v) − x(z,av)〉 = 0. (A16)
9Setting u = 1, Equation (A15) implies that
E˜a|x(z,1)〉 = |x(z,a)〉, for all z = 1, . . . , n. (A17)
Likewise, we get that
E˜b|x(z,1)〉 = |x(z,b)〉, for all z = 1, . . . , n. (A18)
Using induction, it follows from (A17) and (A18) that
U |x(z,1)〉 = |x(z,u)〉, (A19)
which in turn implies that
G∞(z,u),(z′,v) = 〈x(z,u)|x(z′,v)〉 = 〈x(z,1)|U†V |x(z′,1)〉. (A20)
Lastly, combining (A7) with (A20) we get that:
p(ab|z) = G∞(z,a),(z,b) = 〈φz|E˜aE˜b|φz〉 (A21)
and furthermore
λzz′ = G
∞
(z,1),(z′,1) = 〈φz|φz′〉. (A22)
The last step of the proof is to show that [E˜a, E˜b] = 0. For this note that (EaU)
†EbV = (EbU)†EaV which implies
that
G∞(z,au),(z′,bv) = G
∞
(z,bu),(z′,av).
In turn, using (A20) this is equivalent to
〈x(z,1)|U†[E˜a, E˜b]V |x(z′,1)〉 = 0, for all z, z′ ∈ [n], U, V,
which implies that [E˜a, E˜b] = 0.
Appendix B: Distributed QRAC
Here we present the semidefinite program for the distributed QRAC protocol. To start with, let us first present
the quantum characterisation problem, which is modelled by a set of projective operators {Aax}a,x and {Bby}b,y where
a, b, x, y ∈ {0, 1} and a set of transformed quantum code states {|φz〉}z, where z = (z0, z1) ∈ {0, 1}2. For clarity,
in this section we have changed the notation of the measurement operators from Eax to A
a
x to distinguish Alice’s
measurement operators from Bob’s. We assume nothing about these operators and states, except that the Gram
matrix of {|φz〉}z coincides with the Gram matrix of the vectors {|+〉, |−〉, |+i〉, |−i〉}. More precisely, we require that
〈φz|φz′〉 = λzz′ , where
λ =

1 −i+12
−i−1
2 0
i+1
2 1 0
i−1
2
i−1
2 0 1
i+1
2
0 −i−12
−i+1
2 1
 .
Using this quantum model, Alice’s and Bob’s guessing probabilities are given by
p(a = zx) =
1
8
∑
a=zx
p(a|x, z0z1) = 1
8
∑
a=zx
〈φz0z1 |Aax|φz0z1〉,
p(b = zy) =
1
8
∑
b=zy
p(b|y, z0z1) = 1
8
∑
b=zy
〈φz0z1 |Bby|φz0z1〉,
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where the quantum code states and measurements are assumed to be randomly chosen (this can be easily generalised
to an arbitrary distribution). To characterise the quantum behaviour of the protocol, we maximise Alice’s guessing
probability given that Bob’s guessing probability is set to some fixed value τ ∈ [1/2, 1]. More specifically, we consider
the following optimisation problem:
maximize : p(a = zx)
subject to : p(b = zy) = τ
〈φz|φz′〉 = λzz′ ,∀z, z′∑
a
Aax = I,
∑
b
Bby = I, ∀ x, y
AaxA
a′
x = δa,a′A
a
x, B
b
yB
b′
y = δb,b′B
b
y, ∀ a, b, x, y
AaxB
b
y = B
b
yA
a
x, ∀ a, b, x, y.
(A1)
However, as mentioned in the main text, this optimisation problem is computationally intractable. To this end, we con-
sider instead the SDP relaxation of (A1) corresponding to the set of operators S1 = {I, A00, A10, A01, A11, B00 , B10 , B01 , B11}.
Using the label z = (z0, z1) ∈ {0, 1}2 as a classifier, we can partition any feasible solution G to the SDP into 16 blocks
{Gzz′}zz′ , each having size 9× 9. We index the rows and columns of Gzz′ by 0, 1, . . . , 8. The reader may refer to the
following exposition of Gzz
′
for reference:
λz,z′ 〈φz|A00|φz′ 〉 〈φz|A10|φz′ 〉 〈φz|A01|φz′ 〉 〈φz|A11|φz′ 〉 〈φz|B00 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|B10 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|B01 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|B11 |φz′ 〉
〈φz|A00|φz′ 〉 〈φz|A00|φz′ 〉 0 〈φz|A00A01|φz′ 〉 〈φz|A00A11|φz′ 〉 〈φz|A00B00 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|A00B10 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|A00B01 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|A00B11 |φz′ 〉
〈φz|A10|φz′ 〉 0 〈φz|A10|φz′ 〉 〈φz|A10A01|φz′ 〉 〈φz|A10A11|φz′ 〉 〈φz|A10B00 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|A10B10 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|A10B01 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|A10B11 |φz′ 〉
〈φz|A01|φz′ 〉 〈φz|A01A00|φz′ 〉 〈φz|A01A10|φz′ 〉 〈φz|A01|φz′ 〉 0 〈φz|A01B00 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|A01B10 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|A01B01 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|A01B11 |φz′ 〉
〈φz|A11|φz′ 〉 〈φz|A11A00|φz′ 〉 〈φz|A11A10|φz′ 〉 0 〈φz|A11|φz′ 〉 〈φz|A11B00 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|A11B10 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|A11B01 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|A11B11 |φz′ 〉
〈φz|B00 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A00B00 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A10B00 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A01B00 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A11B00 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|B00 |φz′ 〉 0 〈φz|B00B01 |φz′ 〉〈φz|B00B11 |φz′ 〉
〈φz|B10 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A00B10 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A10B10 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A01B10 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A11B10 |φz′ 〉 0 〈φz|B10 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|B10B01 |φz′ 〉〈φz|B10B11 |φz′ 〉
〈φz|B01 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A00B01 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A10B01 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A01B01 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A11B01 |φz′ 〉〈φz|B01B00 |φz′ 〉〈φz|B01B10 |φz′ 〉 〈φz|B01 |φz′ 〉 0
〈φz|B11 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A00B11 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A10B11 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A10B11 |φz′ 〉〈φz|A11B11 |φz′ 〉〈φz|B11B00 |φz′ 〉〈φz|B11B10 |φz′ 〉 0 〈φz|B11 |φz′ 〉

As explained in the main text, the matrix G =
∑n
z,z′ G
zz′ ⊗ |ez〉〈ez′ |, where z = (z0, z1) ∈ {0, 1}2, is Hermitian
PSD and furthermore, its entries satisfy certain linear relations corresponding to the algebraic constraints of the
measurement operators and the Gram matrix of the code states. More specifically, we have that:
Gzz
′
(2i−1,2i) = 0, i = 1, ..., 4
Gzz
′
(0,0) = G
zz′
(2i−1,2i−1) +G
zz′
(2i,2i) = λzz′ , i = 1, ..., 4
Gzz
′
(i,i) = G
zz′
(0,i), i = 1, . . . , 8
Gzz
′
(i,j) = G
zz′
(j,i), i = 1, ..., 4, j = 5, ..., 8
Gzz
′
(i,1) +G
zz′
(i,2) = G
zz′
(i,k) +G
zz′
(i,k+1), i = 0, ..., 8, k = 3, 5, 7
(A2)
Furthermore, Alice’s guessing probability is given by:
p(a = zx) =
1
8
(
G00,00(1,1) +G
00,00
(3,3) +G
01,01
(1,1) +G
01,01
(4,4) +G
10,10
(2,2) +G
10,10
(3,3) +G
11,11
(2,2) +G
11,11
(4,4)
)
, (A3)
and similarly, Bob’s guessing probability is given by:
p(b = zy) =
1
8
(
G00,00(5,5) +G
00,00
(7,7) +G
01,01
(5,5) +G
01,01
(8,8) +G
10,10
(6,6) +G
10,10
(7,7) +G
11,11
(6,6) +G
11,11
(8,8)
)
, (A4)
By optimising Alice’s guessing probability p(a = zx) over all PSD matrices G =
∑n
z,z′ G
zz′ ⊗ |ez〉〈ez′ | satisfying the
linear constraints described in (A2), and additionally, satisfying p(b = zy) = τ for a fixed scalar τ ∈ [1/2, 1], we get
the plot of (2p(a = zx)− 1)2 + (2p(b = zy)− 1)2 ≤ 1/2, as illustrated in Figure 2.
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Appendix C: Coherent-state QKD
Here we analyse the asymptotic security of the phase-encoding coherent-state QKD protocol assuming collective
attacks [35]; the extension to coherent attacks is straightforward using either the post-selection technique [53] or the
recently developed entropy accumulation theorem [54]. The security analysis of the time-encoding QKD protocol is
the same. To this end, we first start with a (hypothetical but equivalent) purified state
|Φ〉 = |+〉A|φ0〉BE + |−〉A|φ1〉BE√
2
,
which is shared between Alice, Bob and Eve after the transmission. The security of this state, with respect to
Alice making the qubit measurement {|+〉〈+|, |−〉〈−|} on her share, is given by the Devetak-Winter’s key distillation
bound [55] and the entropic uncertainty relation for quantum memories [56]:
R∞key ≥ pdet [1−H(Y |Y ′)−H(X|X ′)] ,
where X and Y are random variables corresponding to Alice’s measurement outcomes obtained from {|+〉〈+|, |−〉〈−|}
and {|+i〉〈+i|, |−i〉〈−i|}, respectively, and X ′ and Y ′ are random variable associated with Bob’s measurement outcomes
given y = 0 and y = 1, respectively. Note we have also assumed that the measurement operators corresponding to
detection loss are the same for both measurement settings, i.e., B∅0 = B
∅
1 = B
∅; recall that we are using {Bby}b,y to
denote Bob’s measurement operators.. This is to ensure that the probability of detecting a signal is independent of
Bob’s measurement choice, which is needed to rule out detection side-channel attacks exploiting channel loss [40] (for
example, see ref. [57]). The key rate can then be further simplified using the Fano’s inequality [58], giving
R∞key ≥ pdet [1− h2(εph)− h2(ε0)] ,
where
ε0 =
〈Φ|(|+〉〈+| ⊗B10 + |−〉〈−| ⊗B00)|Φ〉
pdet
, εph =
〈Φ|(|+i〉〈+i| ⊗B01 + |−i〉〈−i| ⊗B11)|Φ〉
pdet
.
The problem here is that pdet, ε0 and ε1 are experimentally accessible, but the phase error rate εph (which is related to
Eve’s information about X) is not. However, the phase error rate cannot be arbitrarily free, for the (hypothetically)
prepared states corresponding to Alice measuring |Φ〉 in the {|+i〉〈+i|, |−i〉〈−i|} basis are close to what she actually
sends, i.e., |±iα〉. Hence, the error rate, ε1, in the parameter estimation basis should be a good estimate of the
phase error rate. In ref. [40], the authors quantified the fidelity between the two preparations using a quantum coin
argument and provided an upper bound on εph in terms of pdet and ε1. However, here we directly maximise εph using
the second level of the hierarchy under the condition that pdet, ε0 and ε1 are fixed to some experimental model (see
main text).
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